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 UPDATING CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS
M. J. ALBIZURI, J. LEROUX AND J. M. ZARZUELO
Abstract. We reexamine the consistency axiom in bankruptcy prob-
lems and propose arguments in favor of an alternative de¯nition of a
reduced problem. The classical de¯nition updates the size of the estate
while keeping agents' claims una®ected. Instead, we suggest updating
agents' claims along with the estate. The resulting consistency axiom
characterizes the well-known Random Arrival rule as the unique bilater-
ally consistent extension of the Contested Garment rule to many agents.
We also establish that our de¯nition of a reduced bankruptcy problem
corresponds to the de¯nition of a reduced TU game proposed in Hart &
Mas-Colell (Econometrica, 1989). JEL classi¯cation: C7.
1. Introduction
A bankruptcy problem refers to a situation in which a group of individ-
uals have rights over an estate, but the estate is not large enough to cover
their joint claims. Such problems appear for instance when a ¯rm declares
bankruptcy and creditor claims cannot be satis¯ed. From a normative stand-
point, the main issue is to ¯nd rules which specify a division of the estate
according to the claims in a fair way via the formulation of desirable prop-
erties, or axioms, which transpose philosophical principles to the problem
at hand. Early work by O'Neill (1982) lays ground to the formalism we use
here to study bankruptcy problems. For an extensive review on this topic
the reader may also consult Thomson (2003).
A principle which has played a signi¯cant role in many economic allo-
cation problems is that of consistency. According to this principle, if a
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subgroup of agents decides to leave the others, the rewards the remain-
ing agents obtain by (re)applying the same sharing rule among themselves
should be unchanged. In bankruptcy problems the consistency axiom, or
its weaker version of bilateral consistency, has been used in the characteri-
zation of several rules rules; see for instance Aumann and Maschler (1985),
or Young (1987) among others. Customarily, in the reduced problem the
residual estate is de¯ned as the original estate minus the sum of the rewards
paid to the departing agents, while all claims remain the same. So in the
reduced situation the estate is updated, while claims are not.
One can argue that this de¯nition only partially handles the problem
reduction by omitting to update agents' claims. Indeed, one can argue that
when agents face their reduced problem, they have already conceded part
of their claims to the departing agents, and vice versa. If so, their claims in
the reduced problem should be updated, and may di®er from their original
ones. For instance, when agent i departs with her share, one may argue that
she forgoes a portion of her claim on the remainder of the estate she is not
receiving. To be consistent with this argument, one must further consider
that the remaining agents also give up a portion of their own claim on the
share of the estate agent i has secured. Following this intuition, we propose
an alternative de¯nition of the reduced problem in which the estate and the
claims are simultaneously updated.
To calculate the share of the claim a departing agent i concedes to a
remaining agent k we proceed as follows. First, partition the estate into
two parts: agent i's claim and the rest of the estate unclaimed by agent i,
if any. The other agents can negotiate this remainder between them in a
subproblem by applying the sharing rule in e®ect. The share of agent k in
this subproblem is not conceded as part of agent i's claim. Therefore, the
part of his claim agent i concedes to agent k is the di®erence between agent
k's share in the original problem and his agent k's share in this subproblem.
Hence, such updated claims are typically less than the original ones. This
de¯nition of updated claims leads to a de¯nition of a reduced bankruptcy
problem di®erent from the traditional one.
A key result in the literature on bankruptcy problems is that the Tal-
mudic solution is the unique bilaterally consistent|in the usual sense|of
the Contested Garment rule (Aumann & Maschler, 1985). By contrast, us-
ing our de¯nition of a reduced problem, we characterize another important
sharing method, the Random Arrival rule (O'Neill, 1982), as the unique bi-
laterally consistent extension of the Contested Garment rule to many agents
(Theorem 2).BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS 3
Finally, in Section 4 we examine the relationship between cooperative TU
games and bankruptcy problems. TU games are particularly suitable to ex-
amining bankruptcy problems, and there exists a natural way to associate
every bankruptcy problem with a TU game. The consistency property has
also received considerable attention in the context of TU games, and sev-
eral de¯nitions of reduced games exist in this literature as well. We shall
focus on the de¯nitions proposed by Davis & Maschler (1965), and Hart &
Mas-Colell (1989) and highlight the relationship between these de¯nitions
of a reduced TU game and the de¯nitions of reduced bankruptcy problem.
Aumann & Maschler (1985) establishes that the traditional way of reducing
a bankruptcy problem corresponds to the Davis & Maschler reduced game.
In turn, we ¯nd (Theorem 3) that the de¯nition of a reduced bankruptcy
problem we introduced here corresponds to the Hart & Mas-Colell reduced
game for bilateral reduced problems. However, in general the Hart & Mas-
Colell reduced game of a bankruptcy problem is not a game associated to
any bankruptcy game for any symmetric rule.
In other words, our results suggest that the dichotomy of the consistency
axiom which is found in cooperative games, but also in cost-sharing prob-
lems1, arises in bankruptcy problems as well.
2. Preliminaries
Let U denote a set of potential agents. Given a non-empty ¯nite subset N
of U, by RN denote the jNj-dimensional Euclidean space with axes labeled
by the members of N, and RN
+ = fx 2 RN : xi ¸ 0g. If S µ N, S 6= ;,
and x = (xi)i2N 2 RN, then xS denotes the projection of x onto RS, i.
e., xS = (xi)i2S 2 RS, and x(S) =
P
i2N xi. Finally, if x 2 R we denote
x+ = maxfx;0g.
A triple (N;E;c) is called a bankruptcy problem, if N is a non-empty
¯nite subset of U (the set of agents involved in the problem), E 2 R+ (the
estate), and c 2 RN
+ (the vector of claims) is such that
P
i2N ci ¸ E. We
will denote ¹ ci = minfE;cig.
Let BU denote the set of all bankruptcy problems with the foregoing
properties.
1See, e.g., SudhÄ olter (1998) for a comparison and Leroux (2007) for a discussion regard-
ing the Davis & Maschler and the Hart & Mas-Colell interpretations of the consistency
axiom in the cost-sharing literature and their respective characterizations of the nucleolus
and the Shapley rule.4 M. J. ALBIZURI, J. LEROUX AND J. M. ZARZUELO





i2N ¾i(N;E;c) = E,
(b) ¾i(N;E;c) · ci;
(c) ¾(N;E;c) = ¾(N;E;¹ c).
The ¯rst condition is an e±ciency property stating that a cost sharing
rule must exactly allocate the total value of the estate. The second property
requires that no agent be awarded more than her claim. Finally, the third
property is one of independence of claims higher than the estate according
to which agents' claims are only valid to the extent that they do not exceed
the total value of the estate.
In the most simple case where only 2 agents are involved, let us consider
the following principle that can be traced back to the Babylonian Talmud:
\Each claimant i concedes (E ¡ ¹ ci)+ to the other, and the remaining is
equally divided". This is known as the Contested Garment principle (Au-
mann & Maschler, 1985). Accordingly de¯ne for each (N;E;c) 2 BU such
that jNj = 2, the CG rule, for each i 2 N by
CGi(N;E;c) = (E ¡ cj)+ +
E ¡ (E ¡ ci)+ ¡ (E ¡ cj)+
2
=
E + ¹ ci ¡ ¹ cj
2
:
Several rules have been suggested for more general problems extending
the CG rule to many agents (for a survey consult Thomson, 2003). For
instance the Talmud rule, T, introduced in Aumann & Maschler (1985), is
de¯ned as follows:
For each (N;E;c) 2 B and each i 2 N,
1. If
P
k2N(ck=2) ¸ E, then Ti(N;E;c) ´ minfci=2;¸g, where ¸ is chosen
so that
P
k2N minfck=2;¸g = E,
2. If
P








We will mainly focus on a rule proposed by O'Neill (1982) commonly
called the Random Arrival rule, which we denote by RA. To de¯ne this rule
formally let ¦N denote the class of permutations of N. For convenience,


















The permutation ¼ represents an ordering on N. The real number MCi(¼)
has the following interpretation. The ¯rst individual in this ordering receivesBANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS 5
his claim, or the entire estate if his claim is greater. The next agent is given
his claim, or the estate that is left if his claim is greater, and so on. Then
MCi(¼) is what agent i would receive if the agents were paid by using this
method. If we assume that all the orderings ¼ are equally likely, then the
expected payo® of agent i is precisely what the RA rule prescribes. That is:







The consistency axiom has played a signi¯cant role in the axiomatiza-
tion of bankruptcy rules (see Thomson, 2006, for a comprehensive survey).
Consistency can be described as follows. Let ¾ be a rule applied to a spe-
ci¯c bankruptcy problem. This rule is said to be consistent if whenever a
subgroup of agents are paid according to ¾|thus leaving the other agents
with a reduced problem|the payo®s of the remaining agents do not change
after (re)applying ¾ to the reduced problem. Several ways of de¯ning a re-
duced problem exist, in turn giving rise to di®erent interpretations of the
consistency axiom.
Given a rule ¾, (N;E;c) 2 BU, and a coalition S ½ N, de¯ne




That is, ES;¾ denotes what is left to the members of S after paying to the
rest of the agents according to ¾. The traditional de¯nition of the reduced




. Note that the size of
the estate is updated but claims are not.
Consequently, following Aumann & Maschler (1985) a rule ¾ is called
CG-bilateral consistent if for any (N;E;c) 2 BU, and every S µ N such
that jSj = 2, its restriction to S coincides with the Contested Garment rule
on the reduced problem of S:
¾S(N;E;c) = CG(S;ES;¾;cS):
Theorem 1. (Aumann & Maschler, 1985) The Talmud rule is the unique
CG-bilateral consistent solution.
In the de¯nition of CG-bilateral consistency presented above, it is as-
sumed that agents keep their claims invariant in the reduced problem. How-
ever, one can argue that this de¯nition only partially handles the problem
reduction by omitting to update agents' claims. Indeed, one can argue that
when agents face their reduced problem, they have already conceded part6 M. J. ALBIZURI, J. LEROUX AND J. M. ZARZUELO
of their claims to the departing agents. If so, their claims in the reduced
problem should be updated, and may di®er from the original claims. Al-
ternatively, when agent i departs with her share, one may argue that she
forgoes a portion of her claim on the remainder of the estate she is not re-
ceiving. In other words, her claim has been "truncated" to equal exactly
her share on the residual problem where she is alone and her residual estate
equals her allotted share. To be consistent with this argument, one must
also consider that the remaining agents give up a portion of their own claim
on the share of the estate agent i has secured via ¾.
Formally, we suggest the following way to update claims. To calculate the
updated claims of agents k 2 Nnfig after agent i has left with her share we
proceed as follows. First, partition the estate into two parts: ¹ ci, i.e. agent
i's claim, and E¡¹ ci, which is the portion of the estate uncontested by agent
i. On the latter portion of the estate, every agent k 2 Nnfig should obtain
¾k(Nnfig;E ¡ ¹ ci;¹ cNnfig). The remainder of agent k's payo®, ¾k(N;E;¹ c) ¡
¾k(Nnfig;E ¡ ¹ ci;¹ cNnfig), is then obtained from ¹ ci. More generally, when
considering the reduced problem of a coalition S ½ N, we de¯ne the updated
claim of agent i 2 S as follows:
(1) c
S;¾
i = ¹ ci ¡
X
k2NnS
(¾k(N;E;¹ c) ¡ ¾k(Nnfig;E ¡ ¹ ci;¹ cNnfig)):





j ¸ ES;¾, so (S;ES;¾;cS;¾) is a bankruptcy problem,
b) 0 · c
S;¾








We say that a rule ¾ is CG-bilateral consistent¤ if for every (N;E;c) 2 BU
and every S µ N such that jSj = 2 it holds
¾S(N;E;c) = CG(S;ES;¾;cS;¾):
As it turns out, this version of bilateral consistency where claims are
updated in the subproblem characterizes the RA rule:
Theorem 2. The RA rule is the unique CG-bilateral consistent¤ solution.
This theorem is consequence of the two following propositions.
Proposition 1. There is at most one CG-bilateral consistent¤ solution.
Proof. Let ¾ and Ã be two CG-bilateral consistent¤ rules. We check that
both coincide on every bankruptcy problem (N;E;c) 2 BU by induction on
jNj, with jNj = 2 being the hypothesis.BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS 7
We assume by contradiction that x = ¾(N;E;c) 6= Ã(N;E;c) = y for
some (N;E;c) 2 BU with jNj > 2. By e±ciency, there exist S = fi;jg ½ N
such that xi > yi and xj < yj. By de¯nition, for any ` 2 S it holds:
c
S;¾




¾k(N;E;¹ c) ¡ ¾k(Nnf`g;E ¡ ¹ c`;¹ cNnf`g)
¢
= ¹ c` ¡ E + xi + xj +
X
k2NnS




` = ¹ c` ¡ E + yi + yj +
X
k2NnS
Ãk(Nnf`g;E ¡ ¹ c`;¹ cNnf`g):
By the induction hypothesis, we have:































But then by de¯nition of the CG rule, we have for each ` 2 S:









which is in contradiction with the fact that xi > yi and xj < yj.
To prove the next proposition the following lemma will be useful. We
introduce the following notation: Given a permutation ¼ of N, and ` 2 N,
we will denote by ¼` the permutation such that:
i) ¼(k) < ¼(k0) implies ¼`(k) < ¼`(k0) for every k;k0 6= `, and
ii) ¼`(k) > ¼`(`) for every k 6= `.
(Thus, in the ordering ¼`, agents others than ` keep their relative order
invariant while ` becomes ¯rst). Also we will denote by ¦` the set of permu-
tations in which ` comes ¯rst; i.e. ¦` = f¼ 2 ¦N : ¼(k) > ¼(`) for every k 6=
`g.
Moreover if ¼ 2 ¦N, and i;j 2 N we denote by ¼ij the permutation in
¦N such that:8 M. J. ALBIZURI, J. LEROUX AND J. M. ZARZUELO
i) ¼ij(i) = ¼(j) and ¼ij(j) = ¼(i), and
ii) ¼ij(k) = ¼(k) for every k 6= i;j.
(i.e., ¼ij interchanges the location of i and j in the ordering ¼ while leaving
the rest of the ordering unaltered).
Finally we denote ¼i
ij = (¼ij)
i.
Lemma 1. If ¼ 2 ¦N and i;j 2 N are such that ¼(i) < ¼(j), then
MCi(¼) ¡ MCi(¼j) = MCj(¼ij) ¡ MCj(¼i
ij):





















































































= MCj(¼ij) ¡ MCj(¼i
ij):
And the proof is complete.
Proposition 2. RA is CG-bilateral consistent¤.
Proof. Let S = fi;jg ½ N, and ¼ be any permutation of N, then we have:
² If ¼(i) > ¼(j): then MCi(¼) = MCi(¼j).




































































By Lemma 1 and the de¯nition of the RA rule we have, and the de¯nition
of the CG rule

































j = CGi(N;ES;RA;cS;RA) ¡ CGj(N;ES;RA;cS;RA):
Hence
RAi(N;E;c)¡RAj(N;E;c) = RAi(N;ES;RA;cS;¾)¡RAj(N;ES;RA;cS;¾):
On other hand by e±ciency
RAi(N;E;c) + RAj(N;E;c) = RAi(N;ES;RA;cS;¾) + RAj(N;ES;RA;cS;¾):
From the last two equalities
RAi(N;E;c) = RAi(N;ES;RA;cS;¾) and RAj(N;E;c) = RAj(N;ES;RA;cS;¾);
and the proof is done.10 M. J. ALBIZURI, J. LEROUX AND J. M. ZARZUELO
4. Cooperative Games and Bankruptcy Problems
A (TU) game on a ¯nite set of players N is a mapping v associating a
real number v(S) with every subset S µ N, such that v(;) = 0. The subsets
S µ N are called coalitions. The real number v(S) represents the worth of
coalition S, interpreted as the total amount that this coalition can obtain
alone, without the rest of the players.
A solution concept is a mapping ¾ associating with each game in a speci¯c
class a payo® vector, i.e. a vector x = ¾(N;v) 2 RN, whose components
represent the payo®s to the players and add up to v(N). Two of the most
prominent solution concepts are the Shapley value and the nucleolus.
There is a natural way to associate a game with a bankruptcy problem (see
O'Neill, 1982). The worth of a coalition S is what is left, after the other
players receive their claims. Thus given a bankruptcy problem (N;E;c)










Having associated a game to every bankruptcy problem, every solution ¾
for TU games automatically induces a rule for bankruptcy problems, which
will also denote by ¾ by abusing notations slightly. It is well known that the
Shapley value gives place to the Random Arrival rule, and the nucleolus to
the Talmud rule (0'Neill, 1982; and Aumann & Maschler, 1985, respectively).
The consistency property has been extensively analyzed in the context
of cooperative games as well. Several interpretations exist there as well
and, just like in bankruptcy problems, also depend on the de¯nition of a
reduced situation. It is instructive to compare the consistency property for
bankruptcy problems with the one for cooperative games.
Following Davis & Maschler (1965), given a game v on N, a coalition S,
and a payo® vector x, the reduced game vS;x on S is de¯ned as follows
(2) vS;x(T) =
(
x(T) if T = S or T = ;;
max
©
v(Q [ T) ¡ x(Q) : Q µ NnS
ª
if T ½ S; T 6= ;;S:
A di®erent notion was suggested by Hart & Mas-Colell (1989). Given a
game v on N, a coalition S, and a TU solution ¾, they de¯ne the reduced
game vS;¾ for all T ½ S as
vS;¾(T) = v(T [ Sc) ¡
X
i2Sc
¾i(T [ Sc;v):BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS 11
A question arises: do these de¯nitions of a reduced bankruptcy game
corresponds to the de¯nitions of reduced bankruptcy problem seen in the
previous sections. The answer concerning the de¯nition of Davis & Maschler
for a reduced game (Expression (2)) is given in the following lemma, where
it is shown to correspond to the "traditional" reduced bankruptcy problem.
Lemma 2 (Aumann & Maschler, 1985). Let (N;E;c) be a bankruptcy prob-





Alternatively, it turns out that the de¯nition of a reduced bankruptcy
problem introduced in the previous section (Expression (1)) corresponds
to the Hart & Mas-Colell reduced game, but only for the case of bilateral
reduced problems, as we show in the next lemma, the proof of which is
straightforward and will be omitted.
Lemma 3. Let (N;E;c) be a bankruptcy problem, ¾ a rule, and S µ N




That is, the following diagrams are commutative
(N;E;c) ! v(N;E;c)
# #






! v(S;ES;¾;cS;¾) = v
S;¾
(N;E;c)
(if jSj = 2):
However, if jSj > 2 the game v
S;¾
(N;E;c) does not correspond in general to
a bankruptcy problem. That is, in general the Hart & Mas-Colell reduced
game of a bankruptcy problem is not a game associated to any bankruptcy
game, as it is shown in the following example. Let N = f1;2;3;4;5g, E =






> > > > > <
> > > > > :
80 if T = S;
35 if jTj = 3;
40=3 if jTj = 2;
0 if jTj = 1;
which clearly is not a game associated to any bankruptcy problem. So the
second diagram is not necessarily commutative in the many-agent case.
Nevertheless, Theorem 2 suggests a characterization of the Shapley value
by means of bilateral consistency µ a la Hart & Mas-Colell as follows.
We say that a solution ¾ on TU games satis¯es 2- consistency µ a la Hart
& Mas-Colell (2-CO) if for every game v on N, and every S ½ N, such that





We call a solution ¾ on TU games standard for 2-person games if for every
game v on fi;jg it holds



















Theorem 3. The Shapley value, for the class of TU games, is the unique
single-point solution concept which is standard for 2-person games and sat-
is¯es 2-CO.
Proposition 1 can be easily adapted to prove the uniqueness part of this
theorem. The existence part is an immediate corollary of Theorem B in
Hart & Mas-Colell (1989) or Theorem 2 in Maschler & Owen (1989). Notice
¯nally that the uniqueness in Theorem 3 does not follow from any of these
two results since in both works the respective authors use an induction
argument on the whole class of games.
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